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Has Three Decades of Comparative Public Policy Scholarship 
Been Focusing on the Wrong Question? 
ABSTRACT 
The essential argument of this paper is that, despite the work of many pioneering schol-
ars, the original agenda of those who came to comparative public policy with a view to 
demonstrating that the functioning of democratic politics makes a difference remains 
substantially unfulfilled. The substance of that agenda was to show that choices made 
through the ballot box influenced not only what governments did, but also had implica-
tions for important aspects of the lives of the citizens making those choices. One impor-
tant reason for this failure was that much of the emergent quantitative literature came to 
focus on differences in government outputs as proxies for whether such differences 
translated into a diversity of real outcomes. In effect, the literature tried to settle the 
question of whether ‘politics matters’ by showing how politics shapes what govern-
ments do without asking the no less important question: does government matter? This 
paper seeks to model a diverse range of outcomes with a view to assessing the impact of 
both political and government spending and taxing variables. On the basis of that as-
sessment, I argue that the challenge for the next generation of political science informed 
comparative policy research is to go beyond an examination of the link between politi-
cal choice and the outputs of government to ask questions about – and ideally to begin 
to map – the linkages between the things governments do and the lives their citizens 
experience. 
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Has Three Decades of Comparative Public Policy Scholarship 
Been Focusing on the Wrong Question? 
DOES GOVERNMENT MATTER? 
The original agenda of the ‘politics does matter’ school of comparative public policy 
research was to demonstrate that political differences amongst nations had an impact on 
public policy outcomes. The differences these scholars had in mind related to the differ-
ential strength of political parties and degrees of class mobilization, but later came also 
to include differences in the character of political institutions and, in particular, the bar-
riers these imposed to progressive reform. Originally, too, the ‘politics does matter’ 
school concerned itself almost equally with two kinds of enquiry: the determinants of 
the size of government and the welfare state and the policies governments pursued to 
control the economy. Arguably, in the 1980s, in the heyday of the debate on the impacts 
of democratic corporatism, the political economy strand became the dominant one, with 
a vast literature emerging on the role of parties, trade unions and corporatist arrange-
ments in shaping macroeconomic policy outcomes (amongst the earliest and most influ-
ential contributions, see Hibbs, 1977; Tufte, 1978; Schmidt, 1982; Goldthorpe, 1984). 
However, a strand of enquiry which had seemed to offer a persuasive account of varia-
tion in the 1980s had increasing difficulties in making sense of macroeconomic devel-
opments in succeeding decades as the countries of Scandinavia, continental Western 
Europe and Japan began increasingly to suffer from the scourge of unemployment and 
slow growth and as countries with few if any pretensions to corporatist intermediation, 
such as the United Kingdom and the United States, became the economic miracle-
makers of early twenty-first century capitalism. 
The declining persuasiveness of at least simpler variants of the ‘politics does matter’ 
account of modern political economy left size of government stories as the main game 
in town. In the 1980s, the relevance of party control to the growth of big government 
became an orthodoxy of the comparative public policy literature, with scholars like 
Manfred Schmidt, John Stephens, Duane Swank, and, later, Klaus Armingeon investing 
heavily in the creation of pooled time-series datasets capturing not just variation in pub-
lic expenditures and, in particular, aggregate welfare spending, but also annual change 
in a wide range of alternative measures of the partisan control of government. Ulti-
mately, when the orthodoxy began to be challenged in the mid-1990s, the debate fo-
cused fairly and squarely on the politics of welfare expenditure, with Paul Pierson 
(1994; 1996) suggesting that ‘a new politics in which all parties had to be responsive to 
demands of welfare clienteles meant that such spending was no longer a function of Left 
partisan control, whilst others, including Schmidt (1996) and Clayton and Pontusson 
(1998), pointed to contrary evidence of persisting partisan effects. Unlike the political 
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economy literature, that concerning itself with public expenditure remains alive and 
well, with the availability of increasingly reliable data sets on sub-aggregates of spend-
ing (including the OECD Social Expenditure Dataset available from the early 1990s and 
the Classification of the Functions of Government – COFOG – data since the mid-
2000s) allowing the protagonists of the ‘party does matter’ position to show that, even if 
aggregate spending no longer always manifests a clear partisan effect (see Huber and 
Stephens, 2001), other types of expenditure, such as unemployment compensation 
(Korpi and Palme, 2003), active labour market outlays (Powell and Barrientos, 2004,) 
public spending on education (Schmidt, 2007), economic affairs spending (Obinger & 
Zohlnhöfer, 2007) and working age cash benefits and caring services (Castles, 2008) 
continue to do so. 
An alternative to public expenditure as a measure of the size of government is the 
revenue base from which that expenditure is funded. Early neo-Marxist scholarship on 
the growth of the welfare state tended to be preoccupied with the notion of ‘fiscal crisis’ 
and the limits to which total revenue or the size of the ‘tax state’ could grow without 
undermining the profitability of the capitalism system on which it rested (see Offe, 
1972; O’Connor, 1973; Gough, 1979). Clearly, too, the size of the ‘tax state’ was no 
less an obvious arena of partisan preference than big spending, with Leftist and working 
class preferences for the latter matched by Rightist and bourgeois distaste for paying for 
the former. However, in part because neo-Marxist scholarship declined rapidly after 
about 1980, and in part because ‘politics matters’ scholars found it easier to make be-
nign assumptions about the consequences of welfare spending than about revenue ex-
traction, taxation based accounts of big government never came to rival big expenditure 
accounts in the comparative public policy literature, although the story was quite differ-
ent in mainstream economics. However, what did emerge from the early 1990s onwards 
was a literature on the political factors shaping differences in national taxation policy 
mixes, with politics mattering not just because some countries taxed and spent more 
than others, but because partisan and institutional differences predisposed countries to 
prefer some types of taxation to others (see, amongst others, Peters, 1992; Wagschal, 
2001; Kemmerling, 2009). 
The aim of this chapter is not to contribute to the ‘politics matters’ debate as such, 
but rather to draw attention to the implications of a point first famously noted by Esp-
ing-Andersen (1990) in relation to social welfare spending and frequently reiterated – 
although rarely acted on - by scholars subsequently: that the expenditure outputs of 
government are not necessarily the same thing as policy outcomes in the sense of mak-
ing a real difference to the lives of individual citizens. Unlike the political economy 
literature which deals with measurable outcomes in terms of economic growth, unem-
ployment and inflation, the ‘politics matters’ interpretation of the findings of the com-
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parative analysis of public expenditure and of taxation mixes rests on the very signifi-
cant and, in the vast majority of studies, unexamined assumption that how governments 
spend and tax translates directly into what happens in the real world. Clearly, this is an 
assumption convenient to make given that data on real world outcomes have until quite 
recently been more difficult to obtain than government spending and revenue numbers 
often routinely published by international governmental agencies. It is, moreover, an 
assumption quite natural to a political science informed analysis of public policy, al-
though one scarcely defensible for a body of scholarship supposedly based on empirical 
enquiry. Whereas a demonstration that politics shapes economic outcomes does genu-
inely show that politics matters, a demonstration that politics shapes spending aggre-
gates and sub-aggregates or the mix of taxes extracted by governments to fund that 
spending makes only half the case, leaving it to be shown that these kinds of expendi-
ture or taxation mixes in turn shape the life chances of individuals in determinate ways.  
Esping-Andersen’s own response to the analytical problem he notices is to replace 
welfare expenditure measures with measures of welfare state entitlement. That response 
is an understandable one for a sociologist seeking to demonstrate a direct link between 
political mobilization and individual life chances, although, of course, there still remains 
a potential gap between entitlements and outcomes. An alternative approach, and one I 
think more appropriate for a political science informed comparative public policy analy-
sis, is to explore the potential for an explicitly two-stage analysis: to show not only how 
politics shapes government expenditures and taxation preferences, but also how – or, 
given the lack of research on such matters, how far - these outputs, in turn, influence 
key variables capturing the quality of life in modern democracies. To put it another way, 
in order to prove politics matters, we also need to answer the question: Does govern-
ment matter? This paper, which uses data from the OECD publication Society at a 
Glance (OECD 2009a) on headline social indicators as measures of real outcomes, is a 
preliminary attempt to do just that. As subsequent sections of the paper show, rather 
than being self-evident, as three decades of comparative public policy scholarship has 
assumed it to be, the evidence for a strong link between big government as measured by 
total public spending or total welfare spending and policy outcomes is extremely weak. 
Relationships with total revenues and with the sub-aggregates of spending and taxing 
are, in many cases, apparently stronger, but are sometimes counter-intuitive, are fre-
quently indirect and often require interpretation. 
POLITICS MATTERS LINKAGES 
This section of the chapter consists of a commentary on three tables presenting correla-
tions between political variables on the one hand and government expenditures, tax 
components and policy outcomes on the other. Table 1 presents correlations between 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 155) 
- 4 - 
Left government partisan incumbency (measured for both the period 1996-2005 to cap-
ture short-term immediate effects and for the period 1960-2005 to capture long-term 
‘Left legacy’ effects – on the latter, see Castles, 2007, 30), union density (for the time-
point 2006) and constitutional structure (as measured in 2005) and a variety of measures 
of government spending with a view to providing a summary check on the ‘politics does 
matter’ hypothesis as it has been conventionally argued in the determinants of govern-
ment spending literature. Table 2 presents correlations between these same political 
variables and a variety of tax revenue measures to check out the same hypothesis in 
respect of the determinants of taxation. Finally, Table 3 looks at the association between 
our four political variables and eight headline social indicators for the mid-2000s se-
lected by the OECD as appropriate measures of self-sufficiency (employment to popula-
tion ratio and share of students with insufficient reading competences), equity (the Gini 
coefficient of income inequality and the gender wage gap), health (male life expectancy 
at 65 and infant mortality) and social cohesion (measured by survey responses on sub-
jective well-being and the percentage of respondents reporting that they had been vic-
tims of crime over the past year) to establish whether there is any evidence of direct 
political impacts on policy outcomes. These indicators (see Appendix A at the end of 
the paper) are extremely wide-ranging and provide the basis for a reasonably compre-
hensive test of the ‘politics matters’ hypothesis. 
The six expenditure measures featuring in Table 1 include the big aggregates of 
spending (total public expenditure and total social expenditure), the major functional 
categories of socially relevant spending (cash expenditure on the aged and survivors, 
spending on health and on education) and, finally, a category of spending noted in pre-
vious research (Castles, 2009) as being closely related to equity outcomes (cash spend-
ing on those of working age together with service provision to the old and families). The 
four taxation measures featuring in Table 2 include the aggregate of all taxation reve-
nue, the total taxation revenue of general government, as well as its three main compo-
nents, income and profits taxes, social security contributions and consumption taxes. 
Data for all categories of spending and taxing are for the year 2006 and all are measured 
as percentages of GDP. All the correlations in these and subsequent tables in this paper 
are based on data for the same group of 21 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Can-
ada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. All data sources are identified in notes to the tables and all expendi-
ture, taxation and outcomes data come from the OECD. 
As a final preliminary it should be noted that the decision to use OECD headline so-
cial indicators as the testbed for establishing the case for whether government matters is 
a way of seeking to avoid the charge that I am setting up an experiment favourable to 
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any particular conclusions concerning the impact of politics and government. The point 
is that these outcomes were chosen by the OECD – not by me - as sensibly representa-
tive of cross-national variation in respect of self-sufficiency, equity, health and social 
cohesion in OECD countries. The outcomes are extremely various, but all clearly have 
substantial implications for the life chances of individuals in modern societies. Some of 
them, like, perhaps, the frequency of crime, one might expect to be only quite indirectly 
or distantly linked with government spending or, at least, with spending as disaggre-
gated as crudely as here (spending for particular programmes to prevent crime might be 
another matter). Others like reading insufficiency and infant mortality are the targets of 
specific government spending programmes, whilst, in many countries, the tax and trans-
fer system as a whole is designed to mitigate the extremes of poverty and inequality. 
Some components of taxation are more progressive than others and hence more equaliz-
ing, while different components have been hypothesized as having diverse effects on the 
composition if not the quantum of employment (see Scharpf, 2000). The implicit as-
sumption that big spending means bigger and better outcomes across the board may 
well be false, but it would be truly surprising and probably justifiably a source of em-
barrassment for comparative public policy research if the most readily measurable out-
puts of government were shown to have little if any impact on many of the outcomes 
identified here. Obviously, other outcomes might have been chosen to test the hypothe-
sis that government matters, and obviously, too, policy instruments other than spending 
and taxing might have been considered, but my aim here is exemplary: to show the way 
so that others may follow in opening up a field of comparative analysis that has been 
surprisingly neglected. 
Turning now to the findings reported in Table 1, there are three points worthy of par-
ticular mention. First, the core ‘politics matters’ proposition that political variables co-
vary with the big aggregates of spending is more or less consistently and moderately 
supported, with short-term Left incumbency positively correlated with both total public 
expenditure and total social expenditure at the .01 level of significance and long-term 
Left legacy associated with social expenditure at this level, but with total public expen-
diture only at the .05 level. Union density is also positively correlated with both at the 
.05 level, while the constitutional structure variable, which is a measure of the number 
of veto-points in each country’s political system, is negatively correlated to total public 
expenditure at the .05 level but not to total social expenditure. On the whole, these find-
ings are in line with the ‘old’ view of public expenditure development that politics helps 
account for the rise of big government rather than the ‘new politics’ view that such dif-
ferences have become increasingly irrelevant.  
Second, however, and with just a few exceptions to be discussed below, it would 
seem that this conclusion must be considerably tempered in light of the fact that, for the 
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most part, these ‘politics matters’ effects are not carried over to the sub-aggregates of 
public spending. Neither the short-term measure of partisan incumbency nor constitu-
tional structure, the two most frequently used political variables featuring in the litera-
ture, are associated with any of the components of social expenditure (although the rela-
tionship between incumbency and working age cash only misses out by a whisker), 
while the two biggest programmes of the welfare state, in most countries taking up to at 
least 60 per cent of social spending – aged cash and health spending – show absolutely 
no evidence of being associated with political variables of any kind. Certainly there is 
nothing here that provides compelling evidence that politics decisively shapes the major 
components of socially relevant spending. 
Table 1:  Correlations between Political Variables and Public Expenditure Aggregates 
and Sub-aggregates, mid-2000s 
Left Government 1996-2005
Left Government 
1960-2005
Union 
Membership 2006
Constitutional 
Structure 2005
 
Pearson Correlation .559** .548* .515* -.444*
Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .010 .017 .044
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .551** .595** .443* -.245
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .004 .044 .284
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .264 .121 -.101 -.076
Sig. (2-tailed) .247 .603 .662 .744
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .316 -.033 -.188 .184
Sig. (2-tailed) .163 .887 .415 .425
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .332 .534* .688** -.302
Sig. (2-tailed) .141 .013 .001 .183
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .432 .720** .759** -.398
Sig. (2-tailed) .051 .000 .000 .074
N 21 21 21 21
Working Age Cash & Other 
Services 2006
Total Expenditure of General 
Government 2006
Total Social Expenditure 2006
Public Aged Cash Expenditure 
2006
Public Health Expenditure 2006
Public Education Expenditure 
2006
Sources: Data on Total Public Expenditure from OECD, National Accounts at a Glance, Paris, 2009b; data on Total 
Social Expenditure, Age Cash Expenditure, Public Health Expenditure and Working Age Cash and Other Services 
from or calculated from OECD, Social Expenditure Database, 2010a; data on Public Education Expenditure from 
OECD, Education at a Glance, Paris, 2009c. Data on Left Government 1996-2005 and 1960-2005 and on Constitu-
tional Structure from Armingeon et al, Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2008,, 2010; data on Union Membership 
as a percentage of employees from OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris, 2010b. Notes: Working Age and Other Ser-
vices = Total Social Expenditure – (Aged Cash Expenditure + Public Health Expenditure); Constitutional Structure = 
additive index composed of five indicators: (1) federalism (0=absence, 1=weak, 2=strong) (2) parliamentary govern-
ment =0, versus presidentialism or other =1 (3) proportional representation =0, modified proportional representa-
tion=1, majoritarian=2 (4) bicameralism (0 = no second chamber or second chamber with very weak powers, 1=weak 
bicameralism, 2=strong bicameralism), (5) frequent referenda=1. 
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Third, the few exceptions possibly indicative of strongly positive political impacts on the 
sub-aggregates of spending both involve measures arguably tapping fundamental aspects 
of the extent of working class political mobilization or ‘power resources’ (see Korpi, 
1978) in modern capitalist societies. The long-term Left legacy variable is designed to 
capture the entirety of the post-war experience of Leftist rule, while the union density 
variable identifies the limited number of countries – essentially, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden - in which working class industrial movement has been 
able to resist the widespread trend to union decline over the past few decades (see 
Wallerstein, 2000; see also Rothstein, 1992, on the factors which have made unions 
stronger in these countries). Table 1 shows, both of these variables, in turn, are strongly 
and positively associated with educational expenditure and with working cash and other 
services spending and, very significantly for our subsequent analysis, it turns out to be 
the case that both of these political variables are significant positive predictors of the 
level of working age cash and other services spending in a regression model with an ad-
justed R2 of .64. This, then, is one area of spending which, prima facie, appears to be 
substantially shaped by political variables. 
The Left legacy finding is not necessarily incompatible with the ‘new politics’ inter-
pretation, since it is possibly indicative of changes brought about by Left incumbency in 
the past that have not dissipated with the passing of time. The union density finding is 
both unexpected and surprising. It is unexpected because, although in the early days of 
comparative public modelling, union density was used as a proxy measure for working 
class mobilization through non-parliamentary channels, the variable ceased to play a 
prominent role in comparative research once Left incumbency measures proved to have 
greater explanatory value in accounting for aggregate expenditures. The finding is sur-
prising because, in an era when most commentators have written the unions off as a 
serious political force, this measure of working class mobilization appears to be of con-
tinuing political relevance and, indeed, the evidence suggests that there are areas of 
spending in which the non-parliamentary channel is of greater importance than short-
term partisan incumbency. That the associations noted here are unlikely to be spurious 
is suggested by the fact that the components of spending with which these political vari-
ables are strongly associated are ones central to class strategies for the amelioration of 
the rewards structure of capitalism either through the removal of educational disadvan-
tage or by providing compensation for the losers in the income distribution through cash 
benefits or benefits-in-kind. These components of expenditure have far less budgetary 
weight in most countries than do aged cash and health spending, but they have always 
been viewed by the Left and unions as pivotal to the achievement of ideologically pre-
ferred outcomes including particularly greater income and gender equality. 
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Table 2 shows the bivariate linkages between political variables, the total revenues of 
government and the main components of the revenue base. As previously in the case of 
the big aggregates of spending, a ‘politics matters’ account holds water, with total reve-
nues moderately associated with short-term incumbency (positively) and political struc-
ture (negatively) and more strongly (positively) with both Left legacy and union den-
sity. Moreover, the linkages between politics and the components of taxation appear 
generally closer than between politics and the major components of spending, with con-
sumption taxes as a percentage of GDP significantly associated either positively or 
negatively with all four political variables, and with Left legacy modestly and union 
density strongly associated with the revenue derived from income and profits taxes. 
Given that income and profits taxes are the most progressive of revenue sources, this 
latter finding again ties in with the idea that those political measures best tapping long-
term and underlying working class mobilization demonstrate a uniquely predictive 
power in respect of outputs related to the achievement of equality outcomes. It is worth 
noting, however, that the link between measures of Left strength and union density and 
reliance on consumption taxes has a less obvious ideological rationale, since the inci-
dence of such taxes tends to be, if anything, regressive in character, with the connection 
between the Left incumbency and outputs, arguably, being the need of big spending 
governments to find ways to extend their revenue base.  
Table 2:  Correlations between Political Variables, Total Taxation Revenue and Com-
ponents of Taxation 
Left Government 1996-2005
Left Government 
1960-2005
Union 
Membership 2006
Constitutional 
Structure 2005
 
Pearson Correlation .457* .695** .716** -.515*
Sig. (2-tailed) .038 .000 .000 .017
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .111 .444* .641** -.221
Sig. (2-tailed) .631 .044 .002 .335
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .248 .170 -.009 -.082
Sig. (2-tailed) .277 .462 .971 .725
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .524* .564** .621** -.790**
Sig. (2-tailed) .015 .008 .003 .000
N 21 21 21 21
Total Tax Revenue 2006
Income & Profit Tax 2006
Social Security Contributions 
2006
Consumption Taxes 2006
Source: All data on total taxation and its components from OECD, Revenue Statistics, 2010c. Political variables as 
Table 1. 
The very strong negative correlation between the number of veto-points in the political 
system and the yield from consumption taxes points to a mechanism in the constitu-
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tional structure giving unique leverage against the Leviathan of big government (on the 
way in which the veto-points inherent in federalism impose constraints on the power to 
tax, see Brennan & Buchanan, 1980). There are no linkages reported in Table 2 between 
any of our political variables and social security contributions, but possibly had we in-
cluded a variable measuring Christian Democratic incumbency, this might have been 
positively associated with a form of funding built into the very fabric of the social in-
surance model of the welfare state holding sway in much of Catholic Western Europe 
(although note that research in this area has tended to omit Spain and Portugal, Catholic 
countries with Christian Democratic parties – see van Kersbergen, 1995). Even conced-
ing that a similar linkage might also exist between Christian Democratic incumbency 
and age cash spending (the funding of which is, of course, the main purpose of social 
security contributions), it would seem that, on the whole, a ‘politics matters’ perspective 
provides a more comprehensive account of the revenue outputs of government than of 
its spending outputs. 
There would be little need for a two-stage analysis of politics on government outputs 
and government outputs on outcomes if there were evidence of strong direct effects of 
political variables on policy outcomes. Table 3, which presents correlations between the 
same four political variables featuring in Tables 1 and 2 and eight OECD headline so-
cial indicators, makes it possible to test whether that is the case. In fact, the evidence is 
anything but strong. Left incumbency over the period 1996 to 2005 turns out to be 
wholly unassociated with outcomes as measured at the end of that period, although the 
Left legacy variable is significantly and negatively related to the Gini index at the .01 
level. Union density is also negatively and significantly associated with both the Gini 
index and infant mortality, with the relationship with the Gini index significant at the 
.01 level. Finally, the only other statistically significant association is the positive one 
between constitutional structure and infant mortality. Of the eight outcome variables 
identified, only two -economic inequality measured by the Gini index and infant mortal-
ity - show signs of being in any way directly linked to politics. The degree to which the 
population is employed, the literacy of the young, the extent of gender equality in the 
economy, how long men live beyond the age of 65, the degree of subjective well-being 
and the likelihood of being a victim of crime all seem unaffected by these major differ-
ences in the functioning of democratic politics. 
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Table 3:  Correlations between Political Variables and Headline Social Indicators, 
mid-2000s 
Left Government 1996-2005
Left Government 
1960-2005
Union 
Membership 2006
Constitutional 
Structure 2005
 
Pearson Correlation -.088 .161 .197 .036
Sig. (2-tailed) .705 .486 .392 .878
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .165 .091 -.347 -.046
Sig. (2-tailed) .476 .694 .123 .844
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation -.200 -.610** -.570** .155
Sig. (2-tailed) .386 .003 .007 .501
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation -.196 -.368 -.339 .239
Sig. (2-tailed) .394 .100 .133 .298
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation -.259 -.121 -.416 .401
Sig. (2-tailed) .257 .600 .061 .071
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation -.293 -.428 -.473* .605**
Sig. (2-tailed) .198 .053 .030 .004
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .022 .336 .306 .169
Sig. (2-tailed) .926 .136 .177 .464
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .045 -.001 .147 .014
Sig. (2-tailed) .848 .998 .526 .952
N 21 21 21 21
Employment to Population 
Ratio 2006
Insufficient Reading 
Competence [PISA] 2006
Gini Index mid-2000s
Gender Wage Gap 2006
Life Expectation Men at 65 
2006
Infant Mortality 2006
Subjective Well-being 2006
Victims of Crime 2005
Source: Data on headline social indicators are from OECD, Society at a Glance, Paris, 2009a. Political variables as in 
Table 1. 
GOVERNMENT MATTERS LINKAGES 
Ultimately, then, much of the case that politics matters in the sense of making a real 
difference to the lives of democratic citizens comes down to ‘the elephant in the room’, 
that is to the largely unexamined assumption that governmental outputs make a differ-
ence to a broad range of policy outcomes. Tables 4 and 5 offer an initial test of this as-
sumption by examining the bivariate relationships between expenditures and outcomes 
(Table 4) and revenues and outcomes (Table 5). Obviously, this test is not an exhaustive 
one because there are many ways governments can influence outcomes other than 
through the quantum of expenditure they devote to particular programmes and the ways 
in which those programmes are funded and the fact that most comparative public policy 
research has focused on spending and taxing is, arguably, as fundamental a criticism of 
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past research as the neglect of the government outputs/policy outcomes nexus on which 
we focus here. Contests over budgetary allocations are, however, at the heart of democ-
ratic politics and clearly, if the evidence suggested that such contests had no implica-
tions for the lives of citizens, it would seriously undermine most standard justifications 
for this form of government.  
The findings in Table 4 split more or less neatly into two, with three spending cate-
gories manifesting multiple links with outcomes and three virtually none at all. Public 
health spending is not significantly correlated with any outcomes and conspicuously not 
so with male life expectation or infant mortality, the two outcomes with which one 
might have assumed this category of spending would be most closely associated. Each 
of the two big aggregates of spending is significantly correlated to just one outcome: 
social spending negatively with infant mortality and total spending of general govern-
ment negatively with years of male life expectation. This latter finding is highly anoma-
lous unless seen through a prism of extreme right-wing ideology, suggesting as it does 
that government spending is actually dangerous to your health. 
The multiple associations between both education spending and working age cash 
and other services spending and policy outcomes, for the most part fit quite easily with 
standard assumptions about the impact of spending. There are no anomalies at all in 
respect of working age cash, which is very strongly negatively related to the Gini index, 
more modestly negatively associated with the size of the gender wage gap and strongly 
positively associated with subjective well-being. There is also every reason to believe 
that more public spending on education will provide the skills required for a high em-
ployment to population ratio and will be conducive to greater income equality and a 
reduced gender wage gap.  
Moreover, if these outcomes led on to greater subjective well-being, it would 
scarcely be surprising. On the other hand, it is somewhat strange that education spend-
ing should co-vary with such a wide range of outcomes but not with reading insuffi-
ciency, while the negative relationship between public education spending and male life 
expectation and the positive one between education spending and victims of crime are 
no less anomalous than the earlier finding of a negative association between life expec-
tation and total public spending. 
The associations between cash spending on the aged and outcomes are consistently 
difficult to interpret. Why should giving cash benefits to those above the age of 65 
strongly and negatively influence the employment of those below the age of 65? Why 
should such spending make for reduced reading competence amongst the young and 
why should more spending on the old make for lesser subjective well-being and very 
markedly lower levels of victimisation in the population as a whole? Some of these 
questions will be addressed in the next section, which attempts in a very tentative and 
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Table 4:  Correlations between Public Expenditure Aggregates and Sub-aggregates 
and OECD Headline Social Indicators, mid-2000s 
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exploratory way to move beyond the simple correlation analysis provided in this section 
of the chapter to model the determinants of each of these headline social indicators 
separately. In the meanwhile, it is worth noting that the most probable reason for the 
anomalies noted here both in respect of educational spending and aged cash spending is 
the covariance of these categories with other variables. One obvious set of candidates 
are demographic variables. High aged cash spending goes along with an aged popula-
tion and high education spending with a youthful one and there would be nothing 
anomalous in the finding that employment levels are lower in a society with a larger 
dependent population (both aged and youthful) or that levels of crime are higher where 
the population is more youthful. 
Table 5:  Correlations between Total Revenues, Components of Taxation and OECD 
Headline Social Indicators, mid-2000s 
Total Tax Revenue 2006
Income & Profit 
Tax 2006
Social Security 
Contributions 
2006
Consumption 
Taxes 2006
 
Pearson Correlation -.016 .534* -.522* -.029
Sig. (2-tailed) .944 .013 .015 .901
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation -.015 -.398 .408 -.017
Sig. (2-tailed) .948 .074 .066 .941
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation -.589** -.457* -.133 -.289
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .037 .564 .204
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation -.550** -.573** .191 -.487*
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .007 .408 .025
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation -.394 -.164 -.060 -.675**
Sig. (2-tailed) .077 .477 .795 .001
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation -.438* .050 -.475* -.454*
Sig. (2-tailed) .047 .831 .030 .039
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation .248 .559** -.264 .018
Sig. (2-tailed) .279 .008 .247 .937
N 21 21 21 21
Pearson Correlation -.014 .485* -.602** .071
Sig. (2-tailed) .950 .026 .004 .759
N 21 21 21 21
Infant Mortality 2006
Subjective Well-being 2006
Victims of Crime 2005
Employment to Population 
Ratio 2006
Insufficient Reading 
Competence [PISA] 2006
Gini Index mid-2000s
Gender Wage Gap 2006
Life Expectation Men at 65 
2006
 
Source: All data from sources referenced in Tables 2 and 3 
Turning finally in this section to the linkages between revenues and outcomes, Table 5 
demonstrates a much wider range of associations than Table 4. Unlike the big aggre-
gates of expenditure, the big aggregate of revenues is significantly correlated with out-
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comes, with income inequality, the gender wage gap and infant mortality all lower 
where the overall taxation base is higher. Each of the separate components of revenues 
is also associated with a range of outcomes, although some are difficult to interpret. 
There is no surprise that the quantum of progressive income taxation should be linked to 
the equity indicators of the Gini index and the gender wage gap. Hypothesized linkages 
between greater income equality and both lower infant mortality and greater subjective 
well-being (for more analysis, see Models 5 and 6 in the next section) also make sense 
of the negative associations between progressive taxes and those variables. Arguably, if 
progressive taxes are used to fund service provision for the old and families (see Esp-
ing-Andersen, 1999), there should be no surprise in the positive link between income 
taxes and employment, but there seems to be little logic in the positive relationship be-
tween the quantum of income taxes and victims of crime.  
The same applies to the mirror image findings for social security taxes: the negative 
relationship with employment seems to fit nicely with Scharpf’s (2000) finding of a 
negative link between higher payroll taxes and business employment, while the negative 
association with victims of crime seems no less mysterious than the corresponding rela-
tionship with progressive taxation. As in the earlier case of the association between age 
cash expenditure and victims of crime, there is reason to suspect that the anomalous 
findings in respect of victims of crime are a consequence of the covariance of these tax 
components with demographic categories. Social security taxation is higher in countries 
with aging populations (correlation = .53) and income and profits taxes are higher in 
countries (correlation = .54). Finally, we note that both infant mortality and the gender 
wage gap are lower where consumption taxes are higher and the far more anomalous 
finding that male life expectation at age 65 is very significantly lower where consump-
tion taxes are higher. This latter is the only really substantial association with this out-
come noted anywhere in our analysis and it will be discussed further in the next section. 
My interim conclusion on the basis of the bivariate findings in Tables 4 and 5 is the 
moderately optimistic one in terms of the core claim of comparative public policy that 
politics matters that there is some real evidence for linkages between at least some 
spending and revenue outputs of government and a wide variety of policy outcomes. 
That there is almost no evidence for the proposition that big government and aggregate 
welfare spending are linked to outcomes may be more a problem for the amour propre 
of a generation of comparative public policy scholars who assumed that it was so than it 
is a substantive problem for our understanding of the logic of policy development. Big 
government and aggregate welfare spending necessarily involve multiple trade-offs be-
tween desired outcomes, so that big spending often conceals more than it reveals about 
policy choices. That is why, as I have argued over a number of years, expenditure 
analysis is only sensibly conducted through a disaggregation strategy identifying which 
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factors shape which expenditure components with what effects (see Castles, 2009). The 
analysis of expenditure in this paper is merely an extension of that argument. It might 
be suggested that the lack of any association between public health spending health out-
comes is a more serious difficulty for the view that government matters, but this is 
probably not the case either. Over the past half century, cross-national variation in pub-
lic health spending has decreased continuously, with a coefficient of variation of 31.52 
in 1960 (Castles, 1998, 164) declining to just 10.65 for the data used in this chapter. In 
effect, spending on health is regarded as mattering so much that most democracies are 
constrained to make a similar degree of expenditure effort in this area, thus leaving the 
field clear for other variables (including, of course, even more disaggregated data per-
taining to particular programmes within the health budget) to shape outcomes like infant 
mortality and life expectation. 
SOME EXEMPLARY MODELLING 
In the previous sections of the paper I have attempted to establish whether there was 
some prima facie evidence of linkages between political variables, government expendi-
ture outputs and policy outcomes in 21 advanced democratic nations. In this final sub-
stantive section of the paper, I present a series of regression models of these outcomes 
with a view to finding out whether government spending variables still feature as pre-
dictors of outcomes when we also take account of the possible impact of some other 
basic differences between these countries in respect of: 
a) demography (the size of the elderly, youthful and dependent populations as well 
as the fertility rate); 
b) culture (adherence to non-Protestant Christian faiths – see Castles, 1994); 
c) economic structure (net national income per capita, which, interestingly, proves 
wholly insignificant in this modelling of outcomes in 21 rich countries, but 
which might very well prove far more significant in a more developmentally di-
verse sample of nations); and 
d) other social outcomes featuring in the analysis. A strong candidate variable in 
this latter respect is income inequality as measured by the Gini index which has 
been strongly claimed to be a determinant of a wide range of significant policy 
outcomes including physical and mental health, life expectancy, educational per-
formance and well-being in general (see Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). If income 
inequality is strongly linked to other outcomes and can itself be plausibly dem-
onstrated as being shaped, directly or indirectly, by political variables and gov-
ernment outputs, then, this would constitute just the kind of evidence we are 
looking for of multi-stage processes of policy determination in which both poli-
tics and government matters. 
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It should be emphasized once again that the status of the analysis here is preliminary 
and my aims are exemplary more than substantive. It would be absurd to pretend that a 
comprehensive statistical account of eight highly diverse outcomes is possible in a pa-
per of this length. The modelling here is under-theorised, does not rely on an exhaustive 
discussion or elaboration of possible hypotheses, only includes a very small number of 
variables specific to particular outcomes and, given the relatively small number of cases 
available for the analysis, only features the limited number of variables that prove statis-
tically significant in combination. Although I take great care to identify probably spuri-
ous relations, and to ensure that that they do not feature in the models presented below, 
I may not always have been successful. It would be wrong, therefore, to see these mod-
els as offering definitive explanations of outcomes. The most I would claim for them is 
that, like those in my earlier book, Comparative Public Policy, they provide “a prelimi-
nary sorting process, informing us about combinations of variables which fit together to 
produce possible accounts” of the outcomes in which we are interested (see Castles, 
1998, 20). The exemplary point I wish to make relates not to any particular model, but 
to the pattern revealed across the models as a whole. If more than a few of these possi-
ble accounts directly or indirectly involve the impact of categories of government 
spending or taxation, then that reinforces the evidence provided by the correlations in 
Tables 4 and 5 that government does, indeed, matter. If, in turn, these government 
spending and taxing outputs can be plausibly linked to political variables such as Left 
incumbency, working class mobilization or constitutional structure, this may be taken as 
support for the viability of the kind of two-stage analysis that I argued earlier offers the 
best promise of demonstrating that politics really does make a difference for public pol-
icy outcomes. 
Self-sufficiency Indicators 
In Society at a Glance (2009a), the OECD argues that self-sufficiency in advanced in-
dustrial societies depends on access to jobs and possession of the skills required to ob-
tain work. The headline indicator of access to jobs is the employment rate for the work-
ing-age population, while the OECD’s chosen skills indicator is the share of students 
aged 15 with reading competencies at level 1 or below. 
Values for the employment rate as a percentage of the population aged 15-64 range 
from the high to mid 70 per cent level in Switzerland and much of Scandinavia to just 
58 per cent in Italy and the low to mid-60 per cent level in Belgium, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. The best fitting model for total employment contains terms for non-Protestant 
Christian adherence, the size of the dependent population and public spending on educa-
tion. Employment is higher where non-Protestant adherence is lower (i.e. where Ca-
tholicism is less entrenched), where the dependent population is lower and where educa-
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tional spending is higher. Note that even controlling for the axiomatic inverse relation-
ship between employment and unemployment, none of these factors ceases to be statis-
tically significant and the adjusted R2 increases to .82. It might be surmised that the re-
ligious and the demographic variables influence total employment by accounting for 
lower levels of female employment in countries where traditional religious values are 
strongest and where women are more likely to remain out of the labour force to care for 
children and the elderly, arguably characteristics most pronounced in Southern Europe 
and the countries of the Mediterranean more broadly (see Gal, 2010). In fact, however, 
regressions unreported here show that both variables are also strongly linked to male 
employment levels, although religious adherence depresses female employment by 
about twice as much as that of males. Educational spending, on the other hand, is a vari-
able which significantly influences female but not male employment levels. The un-
standardized coefficient for public education in Model 1 suggests that, for every one 
percentage point of GDP more spending on education, there will be a 1.6 percentage 
point higher employment rate, while the unreported regression for female employment 
suggests that, for each percentage point of GDP more on spending, there will be a 3.6 
percentage point higher female employment level. We may, therefore, conclude that this 
is an area in which government spending has a direct effect in helping to remove a ma-
jor obstacle in the way of female employment and, hence, in enhancing the job access 
and self-sufficiency of the population. 
Model 1: Employment to Population Ratio 2006 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 143.059 17.624 8.117 .000
Public Education Expenditure 
2006
1.633 .656 .296 2.489 .023
Non-Protestant Christianity -.125 .018 -.814 -6.815 .000
Dependent Population -2.300 .538 -.489 -4.275 .001
a. Dependent Variable: Employment to Population Ratio 2006.                                                                Adj R2 = .78
l
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
Notes: The non-Protestant Christianity variable is, in most countries, equivalent to the percentage of the population 
adherent to the Roman Catholic faith (data from http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/sc3.html). However, in 
Greece, it also includes Greek Orthodox adherents (data from CIA Factbook, 2010). The dependent population is 
equal to the sum of the population aged 0-15 and 65 years and over and is calculated from OECD Factbook, 2010d. 
In the earlier analysis of correlations between components of government spending, it 
was noted that the strongest single correlate of the total employment level was the nega-
tive relationship with public aged cash spending, but it was also pointed out that this 
relationship could well be a spurious one, with age spending standing as a proxy for 
other variables. In fact, age spending turns out to be a proxy for both demographic and 
cultural factors with the effect disappearing once non-Protestant Christianity and the 
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size of the dependent population are included in the model. Obviously, one of the great 
advantages of regression modelling over bivariate analysis is that it can assist in identi-
fying spurious relationships of this kind. It is relevant to note that employment levels 
are one of the few areas where an imputed relationship between government outputs and 
outcomes goes beyond mere assumption, with Scharpf, 2000, (75-85) offering a sophis-
ticated, but nevertheless, exclusively bivariate analysis of the employment effects of 
taxation. His results, which purport to show the strong negative effects of social security 
contributions and consumption taxes on a variety of measures of business employment, 
require checking against the same demographic and cultural variables as feature in 
Model 1. Here, I simply note here that while social security contributions as a percent-
age of GDP is a significantly negative predictor of total employment along with educa-
tional spending, this association also disappears when we control for religious adher-
ence and dependency. 
Model 2: Insufficient Reading Competence (PISA) 2006 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 31.177 3.588 8.690 .000
Tertiary Education in Age 
Group 25-64
-.428 .115 -.649 -3.715 .001
a. Dependent Variable: Insufficient Reading Competence [PISA] 2006.                                                Adj R2 = .39
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
Data on tertiary education in age group 25-64 are from Education: Key Tables from the OECD, 2009d. 
Values for insufficient reading competence range from highs of around 25 per cent in all 
the countries of Southern Europe to the extraordinarily low outlier of Finland with just 
under 5 per cent and with other goodish performers like Canada, Ireland, Australia and 
New Zealand between 10 and 15 per cent. This distribution proves difficult to model in 
any sensible way. The only multi-regressor model that could be generated contained 
positive terms for non-Protestant Christianity and the size of the elderly population with 
an adjusted R2 of .47. Clearly, the size of the elderly population does not provide an in-
telligible explanation for a lack of reading competence amongst the young and it seems 
obvious that what the model is doing is pointing to the difference between the largely 
Protestant countries of the New World (and to some extent Scandinavia) and the largely 
Catholic and aging countries of Southern Europe. In fact, a dummy variable for the four 
Southern European countries proves almost as successful with an adjusted R2 of .45.  
Any sensible modelling of reading outcomes would almost certainly need to start 
from the kind of socio-economic background variables identified in the PISA research 
from which the reading competency used by the OECD originate (see OECD, 2010f). 
For Model 2, I have used the tertiary level of educational attainment for the age group 
25-64 as a proxy for differences in parents’ educational background, which generates a 
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finding that is broadly compatible with the PISA analysis. The only component of gov-
ernment spending significantly correlated with reading insufficiency in Table 4 was 
public expenditure on aged cash and this term ceases to be significant when we control 
for parents’ tertiary education level. The PISA researchers argue forcefully that there 
are ways of counteracting socio-economic factors which impede educational perform-
ance and, to the extent that this is true, it would be wrong to suggest that this is an area 
in which the policy actions of government are ineffectual. However, at the level of 
analysis of this chapter, it must be concluded that this is not an area in which political or 
government spending effects are readily apparent. 
Equity Indicators 
The headline indicators of equity featuring in Society at a Glance (2009a) are the Gini 
coefficient of household disposable income and the ratio of median earnings between 
women and men working full-time. The assumption that government matters is almost 
invariably an assumption that government programmes, and particularly expenditures 
falling into the welfare state category, will produce greater income equality, and the 
high number of significant correlations between the Gini index and the aggregates and 
sub-aggregates of spending and taxing in Tables 4 and 5 above offer considerable sup-
port for that proposition. Discussion of such probable effects has been a staple of the 
comparative welfare state literature from its early beginnings (for contrasting views, see 
Wilensky, 1975, Stephens, 1978 and Goodin & Le Grand, 1987), but systematic com-
parative research has, until quite recently, been frustrated by the absence of reliable data 
published sufficiently frequently to ascertain not only differences between countries but 
also change over time. For OECD countries this is no longer the case with data being 
collected regularly on a quinquennial basis and the OECD itself has shown how the 
progressivity of transfers and taxes contributes to income inequality in around 20 or so 
member states in the mid-2000s (see OECD, 2008), while Castles and Obinger (2007) 
have demonstrated an extremely strong bivariate linkage between gross public social 
expenditure and poverty in 2001 and an only somewhat more moderate one with the 
Gini index in the same year and Castles (2009) has argued that much of this effect stems 
from the equalising effects of working age cash and other services. Cross-national gen-
der wage gap differences have not been modelled in the policy outcomes literature but 
have been analysed in the economics literature, where it has been argued that male wage 
compression together with a lower female labour supply are conducive to a lower gen-
der wage gap, with political effects strongly implicated given that wage compression is 
associated with encompassing collective bargaining agreements and a strong trade union 
presence (see Blau & Kahn, 2001).  
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Model 3: Gini Index mid-20000s 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .389 .018 21.754 .000
Working Age Cash & Other 
Services 2006
-.011 .002 -.760 -5.102 .000
a. Dependent Variable: Gini Index mid-2000s.                                                                                              Adj R2 = .56
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
 
Values for the Gini index vary from lows indicative of high levels of equality in coun-
tries like Denmark and Sweden at one end of the distribution to highs in Portugal, the 
United States, Italy and New Zealand at the other. The model we report here has only a 
single regressor – working age cash and other services – but this successfully accounts 
for more than half the variance in outcomes. A second variable – revenue from con-
sumption taxes – improves the fit of the model, but is clearly spurious, producing a 
positive relationship with the Gini coefficient simply on the basis of Portugal’s high 
values for both inequality and this measure of taxation. Removing Portugal from the 
equation removes any link with consumption taxes and produces a markedly stronger 
relationship with working age cash expenditure. The strength of the relationship for all 
21 cases is shown graphically in the figure below and it may be noted that, even remov-
ing the two extreme cases at each end of the income inequality distribution, leaves a 
relationship still significant at the .01 level. In Table 1 it was shown that the working 
age cash and services measure was moderately linked to long-term Left incumbency and 
very strongly linked to union density, with both terms significant in a regression model 
explaining roughly two-thirds of spending. Neither of these variables proves significant 
in models of inequality containing the government spending term, suggesting precisely 
the kind of indirect, two-stage process that we are seeking to identify in this chapter. 
We encounter what looks like another two-stage effect in our model of the gender 
wage gap. Wage differences between women and men are lowest in New Zealand, 
Norway, Belgium and France and highest in Japan, Germany, Austria and Greece. The 
best fitting model points to what look like two labour supply effects, with high levels of 
female employment making for a lesser degree of gender equality and a larger youthful 
population - and hence a greater proclivity for women to leave the labour force – mak-
ing for greater equality. The greatest effect, however, is the negative impact of educa-
tional spending in reducing the gender wage gap presumably in virtue of supplying the 
skills required for women to command greater rewards for their labour market participa-
tion. The indirect political effect that can be documented here is again with union den-
sity and, to a lesser extent, with Left legacy (see also Schmidt (2007)), which, although 
not showing up in the outcomes model when controlling for expenditure, feature 
strongly in Table 1 as factors closely associated with high levels of educational spend-
ing. 
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Model 4: Gender Wage Gap 2006 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .345 .054 6.432 .000
Public Education Expenditure 
2006
-.042 .008 -.781 -5.129 .000
Youthful Population 0-15 2005 -.014 .003 -.593 -4.252 .001
Female Employment 2006 .005 .001 .680 4.388 .000
a. Dependent Variable: Gender Wage Gap 2006.                                                                                       Adj R2 = .75
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
Data on the size of the Youthful Population from OECD Factbook, 2010d. Data on Female Employment from OECD 
Labour Market Statistics, 2010e. 
Health Status Indicators 
The OECD’s headline health status indicators relate to mortality at the two extremes of 
the age distribution: male life expectancy at age 65 and the infant mortality rate (the 
number of deaths of children under one year of age, expressed per 1,000 live births). As 
noted previously, the most immediately interesting finding of our earlier correlation 
analysis is that neither of these variables is significantly associated with health spending 
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although infant mortality proved to be associated with political variables including un-
ion density and constitutional structure as well as three of four of the revenue measures 
in Table 5. 
I do not report an explanatory model for life expectation. The distribution of values 
for male life expectancy is quite different from those encountered anywhere else in this 
analysis, with Japan, Switzerland, Australia and France at the top of the distribution all 
exceeding 18 years of average expected longevity and Denmark, Portugal, the Nether-
lands, Ireland and Finland at the bottom of the distribution all falling below 17 years 
and the only significant correlates of male life expectancy featuring in Tables 4 and 5 
above were the anomalous findings that higher levels of total public expenditure and 
educational spending and higher levels of consumption taxes were associated with re-
duced health status. Of the whole range of political, government spending, demo-
graphic, cultural and economic variables deployed in this analysis, these proved to be 
the only variables significantly associated with outcomes. The reported association with 
consumption taxes in Table 5 is a strong one, and one which, in principle, might provide 
ideological sustenance to the supporters of the Tea Party, but we note that, disappoint-
ingly for such supporters, the major exception to the anomalous negative relationship is 
the United States itself with very low consumption taxes but only moderate male life 
expectation beyond 65 and that the correlation between change in life expectancy over 
the period 2000-2006 (for data, see OECD 2009a) and consumption taxes as percentage 
of GDP over the same period is wholly insignificant although still negative (-.18). 
Without a compelling hypothetical linkage and without further evidence, the association 
must be regarded as spurious.  
That the distribution of male life expectation cannot be modelled using the variables 
deployed in this analysis need not mean that this is an area impervious to government 
intervention or unaffected by demographic, cultural or economic factors. According to 
Shaw, Horace and Vogel in a paper on the determinants of life expectancy (2005) “the 
general consensus is that population life expectancy (or mortality) is a function of envi-
ronmental measures (e.g., wealth, education, safety regulation, infrastructure), lifestyle 
measures (e.g., tobacco or alcohol consumption), and health care consumption measures 
(e.g., medical or pharmaceutical expenditures).” Most, if not all of these parameters can 
be influenced by the actions of government (for instance, by the subsidization of phar-
maceutical expenditure through the health system or by educational campaigns warning 
of the adverse effects of alcohol and tobacco consumption), but our spending data are at 
far too high a level of aggregation to capture such effects. 
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Model 5: Infant Mortality 2006 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -1.982 1.369 -1.447 .166
Gini Index mid-2000s 7.906 3.035 .366 2.605 .018
Constitutional Structure 2005 .278 .068 .573 4.096 .001
Total Fertility Rate 2005 1.854 .554 .466 3.347 .004
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
a. Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality 2006.                                                                                                    Adj  R2 = .62
Data on fertility rate 2005 from OECD (2009a) Society at a Glance 2009, Paris. 
Modelling infant mortality is far less problematic. At one end of the distribution are the 
English-speaking countries of the United States, Canada, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom with five or more infant deaths per 1,000 live births and at the other Japan, 
Sweden and Norway with less than three deaths per 1,000 live births. Model 5 suggests 
that infant deaths are most frequent in those countries where women are most fertile, 
where the constitutional structure contains a greater numbers of veto-points and where 
income inequality as measured by the Gini index is greatest. None of these findings is 
particularly surprising. That infant mortality is higher where women have greater num-
bers of children is a commonplace of the demographic literature, while the role of in-
come inequality in governing access to health care and, hence, influencing infant mor-
tality is a hypothesis of very long standing (see Russett et al, 1964, 199).  
That there should be a direct connection between constitutional structure and health 
outcomes may not be intuitively obvious, but it has, in fact, long been argued in the 
‘policy matters’ literature that federalism, which provides the most dramatic instance of 
multiple veto-points, significantly impedes the capacity to legislate the health policy 
programmes required to reduce infant mortality on a uniform national basis (for evi-
dence relating to infant mortality outcomes, see Castles and McKinlay, 1979; for a more 
qualitative analysis of the development of the health care sector as a whole, see Immer-
gut, 1992). Replacing the constitutional structure term in Model 5 with a federalism 
dummy also produces a result in which all three terms remain statistically significant at 
the .01 level, although somewhat reducing the model’s adjusted R2. The impact of con-
stitutional structure in Model 5 is the first instance in this analysis of politics impacting 
directly on outcomes. Since our analysis in respect of Model 4 has already demonstrated 
that cross-national income inequality is very substantially shaped by government spend-
ing, which in turn co-varies strongly with union density and Left legacy, there is evi-
dence here too of a long chain of indirect effects from politics and government spending 
to income inequalities and the health status of the population. 
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Social Cohesion Indicators 
The OECD’s chosen headline indicators of social cohesion are average life-satisfaction 
(subjective well-being) scores and crime victimisation (the share of people who have 
been victims of a criminal offence in the previous calendar year). These indicators both 
derive from survey studies - well-being from the 2006 Gallup World Poll and victimisa-
tion from the International Crime Victim Survey – and are not available on the same 
kind of regular basis as the OECD expenditure and revenue data used elsewhere in this 
analysis. 
Model 6: Subjective Well-being 2006 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 4.470 1.544 2.895 .011
Gini Index mid-2000s -8.735 2.056 -.537 -4.248 .001
Constitutional Structure 2005 .094 .044 .257 2.150 .047
Employment to Population 
Ratio 2006
.049 .018 .356 2.701 .016
Total Fertility Rate 2005 .953 .373 .318 2.555 .021
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
a. Dependent Variable: Subjective Well-being 2006.                                                                                   Adj R2 = .72  
Values for subjective well-being are highest in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland and lowest in Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. The successful terms in 
the model are, for the most part, intuitively appealing, with life-satisfaction highest in 
those nations where more people are employed, where there are more babies and where 
there is the greatest income equality. Given the evidence we have that the main deter-
minant of income inequality is spending on working age cash benefits and other ser-
vices, the strong negative relationship with well-being provides support for recently 
reported findings suggesting the existence of a strong positive link between the social 
wage and happiness outcomes (Pacek and Radcliff, 2008), while the employment find-
ing is, arguably, the obverse side of the frequently noted depressive effect of unem-
ployment on subjective well-being (see Frey and Stutzer, 2005). The reason why a con-
stitutional structure with a large number of veto-points should confer greater life-
satisfaction is less obvious, although protagonists of limited government might want to 
see the finding as a vindication for the view that government intervention to procure 
greater equality is not the only route to greater happiness. It is worth noting, however, 
that, here, unlike in the case of infant mortality, the constitutional structure (and the 
fertility) variable cease to be significant if the United States is omitted from the equa-
tion.  
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Model 7: Victims of Crime 2005 
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -6.155 4.577 -1.345 .195
Youthful Population 0-15 2005 1.251 .262 .738 4.770 .000
a. Dependent Variable: Victims of Crime 2005.                                                                                            Adj R2 = .52
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
 
Our final modelling exercise in this paper is of variation in the reported incidence of 
crime. By this measure of social cohesion, the most criminally disruptive societies in 
our OECD sample are New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands, 
while Spain, Portugal, Japan and France are the least disruptive. The Scandinavian 
countries tend to fall in the middle of the distribution. This distribution is both familiar 
and unfamiliar, with countries clustering into ‘families of nations’ in a manner quite 
familiar from the policy outcomes literature (see Castles, 1993), but with families or-
dered rather differently (see Norris, 2009). Instead of, as in the case of the big aggre-
gates of government, Scandinavia coming at one end of the distribution with the Eng-
lish-speaking countries at the other end and continental and Southern Europe in the 
middle, here Scandinavia is in the middle of a distribution with the continental coun-
tries, and particularly, Southern Europe at one end and the English-speaking world at 
the other. 
As earlier in the case of reading insufficiency and the Gini index, no sensible multi-
regressor model of outcomes is possible using the variables deployed in this analysis. 
By a tiny margin, the strongest correlate of crime victimisation in our dataset is the 
negative relationship with aged cash expenditure identified in Table 4. However, as 
noted in the commentary on that finding, it seems highly probable that this is a spurious 
relationship standing as a proxy for aspects of the age structure of the population, with 
the correlation between victims of crime and the percentage of the elderly (aged 65 and 
over) in the population being -.71 and with the percentage of the youthful (0-15 years) 
being .74. The English-speaking countries have relatively youthful age structures; 
Southern Europe and Japan are aging, which, of course, is why these countries expend 
so large a proportion of their resources on aged cash benefits. Since the idea that the 
young (although not the age group below 15 years of age for the most part) are likely to 
be responsible for the bulk of crime (and also most likely to be its victims) fits with evi-
dence of strongly declining criminality by successive age groups (Sutherland, Cressey 
and Luckenbill, 1992, 157), Model 7 features the youthful population as its one signifi-
cant regressor of the victims of crime. There is no evidence of either political or gov-
ernment spending effects and, although inequality is frequently seen as an important 
determinant of criminality, there is no significant relationship between the Gini index 
and victims of crime even at a bivariate level. There is also no significant correlation 
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between victimisation and unemployment although such a relationship is frequently 
adduced in the literature. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY OUTCOMES RESEARCH 
In terms of the objective of this chapter to identify linkages between politics, govern-
ment spending and policy outcomes, the particular content of any of the above models is 
not the main point. Rather what is of interest is the pattern revealed across the models as 
a whole. This study has examined eight sets of outcomes. Three of them – reading in-
sufficiency, life expectancy and victims of crime – manifest no signs of government 
output impacts, at least measuring outputs as we have here in terms of the big aggre-
gates and major components of social spending and the aggregate of revenues and its 
components. Three more outcomes – employment, the gender wage gap and income 
inequality – provide evidence of direct effects, with greater educational spending asso-
ciated with greater employment and a lower wage gap and with greater spending on 
working age cash and services associated with lower income inequality. Finally, the two 
remaining outcome measures – infant mortality and subjective well-being – are linked 
with expenditure at one remove, with lower income inequality associated with both 
lower infant mortality and with greater subjective well-being. Interestingly, despite the 
fact that the bivariate linkages between taxing and outcomes were more consistently 
significant than those with expenditure, it is expenditure that proved most successful in 
predicting outcomes in the models featuring in the previous section of the paper, argua-
bly because expenditure programmes are more directly targeted to the achievement of 
particular outcomes than are revenue components. The evidence here suggests that some 
kinds of government expenditure are strongly associated with some kinds of policy out-
comes - and, in particular, with equity outcomes - and on this basis I think it reasonable 
to argue that a comparative public policy which has hitherto largely assumed that ex-
penditure outputs matter should in future spend more time actually demonstrating the 
mechanisms by which this comes about. 
What I think future comparative public policy research should not do is to devote too 
much more time and energy to the question of the determinants of the big aggregates of 
public and social spending, which, although, as shown in Table 1, are moderately asso-
ciated with political incumbency as the ‘politics matters’ school has always insisted, are 
never themselves significantly linked with outcomes in any of the models presented 
here. The reason, as already noted in passing, is quite obvious: government spending is 
finite and governments’ priorities are diverse, so that big spenders in one area will in-
evitably be small or medium spenders in others. As I have argued for many years, the 
focus of attention of comparative policy research needs to shift to the components of 
public and social spending, where we are far more likely to discover the obvious: that 
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governments that spend big on programmes designed to achieve particular objectives 
are more likely to achieve those objectives than those which do not. The cases here are 
illustrative: governments that spend more on skills acquisition through education do get 
higher levels of employment and do reduce gender inequalities in the workplace, and 
countries which offer greater benefits to low income earners and provide more services 
to families and the aged do reduce overall levels of income inequality. In these respects 
government spending clearly does matter a great deal. Arguably, the more we are will-
ing and able (obviously the availability of appropriate data has been and remains a con-
straint) to disaggregate expenditure (both public and private), the easier it will be to 
demonstrate that spending matters. Within the education budget, there may well be pro-
grammes that help account for reading insufficiency and, within the health budget, pro-
grammes - like the extent of free or subsidized pharmaceutical provision - that may help 
to account for cross-national differences in life expectancy. 
Lastly, I wish to address one final point about the future agenda of scholarship in 
comparative public policy which relates to the need to pay more attention to the ques-
tion of how politics matters than to headline demonstrations of the mere fact that one or 
other political variable is associated with government spending or with real outcomes. 
Here we have shown that short-term partisan incumbency is associated with big gov-
ernment, but not with its separate components and not with policy outcomes. On the 
other hand, constitutional structure appeared to be directly implicated with infant mor-
tality and, dependent on the inclusion of the United States in the model, also subjective 
well-being. Moreover, working class mobilization as measured by union density and the 
long-term legacy of Leftist rule was very strongly associated with expenditure compo-
nents that had important impacts either directly or indirectly on a very wide range of 
outcomes (see Appendix B for an illustrative critical path diagram of linkages between 
working class mobilization, governmental outputs and equity and subjective well-being 
outcomes based on the analysis in this paper). Locating such patterns, mapping their 
persistence over time and offering coherent theoretical accounts for their development 
are all important topics for comparative research, with a possible hypothesis that the 
impact of short-term partisan incumbency on particular components of expenditure has 
declined over the past half century as innovatory reforms promoted by Left govern-
ments have gradually diffused to become policy verities for all governments in ad-
vanced nations (even the United States now has something resembling a national health 
scheme). A final question is why, when it has been largely ignored by the ‘politics mat-
ters’ literature for more than a quarter century, does working class mobilization as 
measured by union density turn out to have such a strong relationship with some major 
components of spending when short-term partisan incumbency does not? Thirty years 
ago Manfred Schmidt argued that “certainly, it would be valuable if the extra-
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parliamentary politics of capitalist democracies featured more prominently in future 
public policy research” (Schmidt, 1982, 164). That remains as true today as it did then. 
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APPENDIX A: OECD Outcomes Data Mid-2000s 
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APPENDIX B:  Critical Paths from Politics via Government to Equality and Subjective 
Well-being 
Left legacy 
                                                                                                                                             Employment                               Fertility 
                                                                                                                                                                   .346**                    .307* 
                                             .403** 
 
   .174 
                                                                                Working age cash            .082                                                Well-being 
and other services                                                         (Adj. R2 = .67) 
                                                                                   (Adj. R2 = .64) 
        .625*** 
                                                                         .045 
                                                                                  -.694** 
                                                                                                                                                                                .264 
                         .507**     -.499**     
                                                                                                                                                        Constitutional structure 
 
                       -.137                                            Gini 
                                                                                                     (Adj.R2 = .51) 
Union density  
Notes and sources: The strength of paths is indicated by standardized regression coefficients. Significance:  
* = p ‹ 0.10; ** = p ‹ 0.05; *** = p ‹ 0.01. All variables are as sourced in the text of this Working Paper.  
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